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Abstract 
We investigated whether 20 emotional states, reported by 170 participants after participating in a 
Trust game, were experienced in a patterned way predicted by the “Recalibrational Model” or 
Valence Models. According to the Recalibrational Model, new information about trust-based 
interaction outcomes triggers specific sets of emotions. Unlike Valence Models that predict 
reports of large sets of either positive or negative emotional states, the Recalibrational Model 
predicts the possibility of conflicted (concurrent positive and negative) emotional states. 
Consistent with the Recalibrational Model, we observed reports of conflicted emotional states 
activated after interactions where trust was demonstrated but trustworthiness was not. We 
discuss the implications of having conflicted goals and conflicted emotional states for both 
scientific and well-being pursuits. 
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1. Introduction 
We have investigated whether 20 emotions, reported by 170 participants after completing 
a Trust game and learning of its outcome, were experienced in a patterned way that conforms to 
predictions of the “Recalibrational Model” or predictions of Valence Models (e.g., Lang et al. 
1993, 1994; Clore, Ortony, and Foss 1987; Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1988; Russell and Carroll 
1999; Kuppens et al. 2012). The Recalibrational Model predicts the activation (or arousal) of 
emotions according to several dimensions (short-sighted, long-sighted, positive, negative, 
interpersonal, and intrapersonal) while Valence Models often predict the activation of emotions 
according to a positive-negative affect dimension alone. The Recalibrational Model is also 
distinguished from the Valence Models in that it predicts the possibility of conflicted emotional 
states. 
The first part of the Recalibrational Model (1.1 in Figure 1), untested by this study, 
describes how the relative calibration of “short-sighted” (V), and “long-sighted” (U) programs 
ultimately determines Investor and Trustee behavior propensity when individuals are confronted 
with a Trust game choice dilemma. The relative power of these programs determines the extent 
to which an individual’s behavior in a trust-based interaction trades off the short-sighted goal 
(opportunism) for the long-sighted goal (developing a trust-based exchange relationship). 
The second part of the model (1.2 in Figure 1), in which the integration of new 
information (from trust-based decisions and interaction outcomes) triggers emotions, is the focus 
of this study. According to the Recalibrational Model, emotions acting jointly in five sets to 
recalibrate the operation of short-sighted and long-sighted programs in both self and others are 
triggered by new information about Trust game outcomes. These sets of emotions 
computationally identify and respond to the presence of specific adaptive problems based on 
Trust game decisions and outcomes.  
A third part of this model (1.3 in Figure 1), untested with this research, specifies the 
kinds of targeted recalibration effects (i.e., “positive” upregulation and/or “negative” 
downregulation of short-sighted and long-sighted programs) that we expect activated emotions to 
encourage, resulting in changes to behaviors in self and others. 
Consistent with the recalibrational functions proposed by our model and the premise of 
competing programs in humans’ conflicted minds, we observed participants frequently reporting 
conflicted emotional states. In particular, participants reported experiencing simultaneously 
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activated positive and negative emotion sets after interactions where trust was extended but 
trustworthiness not demonstrated. For example, investors reported experiencing simultaneous 
activation of emotions in Set 5 (especially guiltiness) and Set 1 (especially contentment) while 
trustees reported simultaneous activation of emotions in Set 4 (especially anger) and Set 2 
(especially pride). States of conflicted emotion activation are not predicted by simpler models 
still de riguer today, such as the bipolar affect Valence Model where activated positive or 
negative emotions are experienced as interdependent negatively correlated opposites (e.g., see 
Lang et al. 1993; Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1988; Russell and Carroll 1999), or the two 
dimensional V-shaped “arousal=affect” models1 where it is assumed that arousal reflects either 
the intensity of pleasure or displeasure but never both (e.g., Clore, Ortony, and Foss 1987; Lang, 
1994; Kuppens et al. 2012). 
Below, we report the results of factor analysis and structural equation modeling, 
providing evidence that the multivariate Recalibrational Model significantly outperforms the 
Valence Model when describing the patterned experience of emotions reported after a Trust 
game. These results support the theory that sets of recalibrational emotions are triggered in 
patterned response to the adaptive problems produced by trust-based interactions. 
 
1.1. Trust-Based Decision Dilemmas and Behavior Regulation by Short-Sighted and Long-
Sighted Programs 
When one is confronted with a dilemma, there is an internal conflict over how to pursue 
alternative desired outcomes that cannot be simultaneously fulfilled at their maxima. We study 
such a dilemma modeled by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), which we refer to as the Trust 
game. In the Trust game, an Investor first decides how much of a $10 endowment to send a 
paired Trustee, with the amount sent tripled, and then the Trustee decides how much of the 
tripled investment, or income, to return to the Investor.  
                                               
1 Thayer (1989) proposed that two different types of arousal existed, one positive and the other negative. Similarly, 
the PANAS was designed with some items that contribute to an intended PA scale (designed to assess the 
combination of positive valence and high arousal) and other items that contribute to an intended NA scale (designed 
to assess the combination of negative valence and high arousal). As such, each valenced scale is intended to activate 
according to “arousal=valence”. We appropriated the PANAS approach of surveying emotions but test predictions 
that deviate from expectations of the original assumptions that activation of arousal on one scale is exclusive to 
activation of arousal on the others scale. 
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The Trust game provides both short-sighted opportunity for gaining available resources 
and the possibility of developing the foundations for a trust-based exchange relationship – a 
long-sighted security against the income risks associated with endowment asymmetry (such as 
resulting from the 50% chance of being Investor in this kind of experiment). Short-sighted 
programs evolved to solve the adaptive problem of competition for limited resources with 
fleeting availability by encouraging capture of all resources present before they are depleted, 
foregone, or the possibility of seizing them becomes less certain or riskier. Reliable trust based 
exchange relationships are important securities that buffer against resource shortages and times 
of scarcity associated with risky income (e.g., from hunting, where ‘lucky’ individuals with food 
share with ‘unlucky’ individuals without food, with the expectation of reciprocity when roles are 
reversed). Indeed, laboratory studies have demonstrated that, in response to unsynchronized 
resource availability among individuals in a common environment, people act pre-disposed to 
engage in asynchronous trading relationships (Kaplan et al. 2012).  
We propose that these adaptive problems, modeled by the Trust game, are regulated by 
short-sighted and long-sighted programs (e.g., see Carrillo 1998; Kurzban 2010) in conflict with 
one another (Livnat and Pippenger 2006). The relative calibrations of an individual’s short- and 
long-sighted programs (determined by their unique histories, emotional capital, and present 
demands) regulate individuals’ behavior propensity2 in dilemmas such as the Trust game (see 
Figure 1). According to this dual program perspective, the Investor decision trades off his short-
sighted “opportunistic” goal (achieved with earnings from a kept endowment and a maximally 
profitable investment) with his long-sighted “cooperative” goal (achieved by developing an 
exchange relationship in which both trust and trustworthiness are maximally demonstrated). 
Likewise, the Trustee, having received a trust-based multiplied transfer of funds from the 
Investor, must decide whether to pursue her short-sighted program’s goal (by keeping this 
income), or else pursue her long-sighted program’s goal of developing a trust-based exchange 
relationship by returning an amount equal to or greater than what the Investor originally sent and 
thereby demonstrating her trustworthiness. 
 
                                               
2 While we expect individual differences in degree (i.e., variance in relative strengths of regulatory programs or 
emotions), we do not expect differences in kind (i.e., direction of calibrational effects), since we take the existence 
of these programs to be species-typical adaptations. 
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1.2. Recalibrational Functions of Emotions and Prediction of Emotional Experience 
Based on our review of the emotion literature and the functional features of 
recalibrational emotions proposed by Schniter and Shields (2013), we consider 20 emotions that 
cluster into five categories (see Table 1) based on constellations of their shared functional 
features. We chose to classify and predict the twenty emotional states studied because they are 
frequently used in versions of the one-dimensional Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) 
developed by Watson et al. (1988), and predicted by the Valence Model that we compare to the 
Recalibrational Model.  
Nesse (2004, p.1138) states that, while emotions have been selected for because of their 
ability to solve specific adaptive problems, “...there is no one to one correspondence between an 
emotion and a function. One emotion can serve multiple functions, and one function may be 
served by several different emotions.” Consistent with Nesse, our functional classification of 
twenty emotions yields five unique sets containing multiple emotions that we expect to be 
triggered in concert for common functional purposes (i.e., to facilitate achievement of short- and 
long-sighted program goals). We characterize these functions as positive and negative 
recalibrations, intra and interpersonally targeting short- and long-sighted programs. 
Generally, an adaptationist and functional perspective of emotions (e.g., Tooby and 
Cosmides 1990; Buck 1999; Cosmides and Tooby 2000) argues that emotions facilitate 
behavioral regulation by recruiting the assistance of a number of psychological, physiological, 
and behavioral processes that provide either positive or negative feedback (pleasant and 
unpleasant experience) used in updating the calibration of conflicting internal regulatory 
variables. Pleasant experiences are rewarding and can incentivize approach behavior and 
continuation of the prior behavior or interaction that triggered them (Watson et al. 1999; Carver 
and Scheier 1990). Unpleasant experiences are costly and motivate a change, whether through 
behavior reduction, avoidance, or aggression (Gray 1971). Of the set of twenty emotional states, 
we conjecture that nine [appreciative, happy, content, cheerful, triumphant, inspired, secure, 
proud, believable] are experienced as positive, one [surprise] could be either positive OR 
negative (forming the unique Set 3), and ten [disgusted, jealous, aggravated, frustrated, angry, 
depressed, sad, embarrassed, ashamed, guilty] are negative. 
Emotions are ultimately designed to deal with adaptive problems requiring program 
orchestration (Tooby and Cosmides 1990, Cosmides and Tooby 2000). The optimal calibration 
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of programs managing an individual’s behavior in a particular interaction depends in part on the 
calibration of other’s behavior regulation programs.  To solve this adaptive problem, emotions 
facilitate the achievement of program goals via intrapersonal and interpersonal behavior 
regulation (e.g., see Levenson 1999; Van Kleef et al. 2004; Butt, Choi, and Jaeger 2005). Below 
we discuss emotions with intrapersonal effects (reinforcing, maintaining, or changing one’s own 
behavior), and interpersonal effects (reinforcing, maintaining, or changing another’s behavior).  
When one’s prior actions did not succeed in achieving an adaptive goal, intrapersonal 
negative emotions are triggered to recalibrate one’s own regulatory programs (Carver and 
Scheier 1990; Gómez-Miñambres and Schniter 2013). For example, guilt, an intrapersonal 
emotion triggered exclusively in response to a failure of the long-sighted program, recalibrates 
(i.e., downregulating) one’s short-sighted program, decreasing the value of immediate 
opportunistic payoffs. As a result, valuation of the long-sighted goal increases, affecting the 
ability to “commit” to its pursuit (Frank 1988). On the other hand, when one’s prior actions have 
succeeded in achieving an adaptive goal, positive emotions are triggered and recalibrate 
regulatory programs in the self to ensure further achievements. For example, the experience of 
feeling believable and proud occurs when positive emotions are triggered by the decision to 
engage in cooperative behavior. These positive intrapersonal emotions upregulate the long-
sighted program (relative to the short-sighted program) so as to further encourage the behavior 
that led to successful cooperation. We conjecture that, of the twenty emotional states studied, 
seven [triumphant, inspired, secure, proud, believable, surprised, guilty] are exclusively 
intrapersonal.  
Another way that emotions are designed to function is interpersonally: by regulating 
others’ programs in an effort to affect interaction behaviors with one’s self. For example, 
consider the gratitude emotion. Discovery that another has foregone short-term rewards in the 
pursuit of a long-term exchange relationship with one’s self, for example by providing resource 
or assistance, presents a fortunate relationship building opportunity for the recipient. Gratitude 
and appreciation can signal one’s favorable valuation of the other and propensity to cooperate 
with them (Tooby and Cosmides 2008), encouraging future trust much in the way that 
“promises” do (Schniter, Sheremeta, and Sznycer 2013). Experimental evidence supports this 
functional account of grateful and appreciative feelings (Tesser, Gatewood, and Driver 1968; 
Algoe, Haidt, and Gable 2008; McCullough et al. 2001). 
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We conjecture that most of the emotions studied (thirteen of twenty), function both 
intrapersonally and interpersonally. By initiating self-imposed recalibrations with the functional 
equivalence of recalibrations that the offended party might otherwise impose, shame and 
embarrassment downregulate the other’s non-cooperative inclination so as to preempt targeted 
inter-personal recalibrations of one's self. For example, shame could preempt another’s anger or 
disgust reaction if it preemptively led to self-punishment and distancing one's self from the other. 
Likewise, the appeasement function of embarrassment may act remedially; by effectively 
allowing rule violators to hedonically punish themselves, the angry and aggressive responses of 
offended parties are preempted (Keltner, Young, and Buswell 1997; de Jong 1999).  
While we conjecture that fifteen of the twenty emotional states studied may facilitate the 
achievement of either short- or long-sighted programs’ goals, we consider five emotional states 
to exclusively facilitate achievement of the long-sighted program’s goal. Of these we derive two 
unique sets: a positive and exclusively intrapersonal Set 2 [proud, believable] and a negative Set 
5 [embarrassed, ashamed, guilty]. The positive emotional states that facilitate both short-sighted 
and long-sighted programs [appreciative, happy, content, cheerful, triumphant, inspired, secure] 
form the unique Set 1. The negative emotional states that facilitate both short-sighted and long-
sighted programs [disgusted, jealous, aggravated, frustrated, angry, depressed, sad] form the 
unique Set 4. We next explain how, according to the recliabrational theory, emotions are 
triggered by computationally assessments of successes and failures in the Trust game. 
 Our recalibrational theory of emotions is built around conflicting short-sighted and long-
sighted behavior regulation programs, which determine an individual’s choices when faced with 
decision dilemmas, such as in the Trust game. We propose that the emotions facilitating 
achievement of these programs’ goals computationally assess game outcomes for the purpose of 
identifying and reacting to successes and failures of the short-sighted and long-sighted programs 
(in self and other). According to our model, emotions are “triggered” when they integrate 
information about the Trust game outcome and computationally identify specific successes and 
failures. We label these computational triggers L and S, for the long-sighted program’s goal 
achievement and the short-sighted program’s goal achievement, respectively. 
We define the following variables observed in our Trust game: endowment (= e), amount 
sent by Investor (= s), amount returned by Trustee (= r). We calculated success (with a maximum 
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of 1 and minimum of 0) of the short-sighted program achieving its goal (S) according to 
competing perspectives of the Investor (I) and Trustee (T): 
SI = (e – s + r)/(e + 2s) 
ST = (3s – r)/3s if s > 0, else 0. 
We calculated success (with a maximum of 1 and minimum of 0) of the long-sighted 
program achieving its goal (L), based on the mutual perspective shared by Investor and Trustee: 
L = Trust * Trustworthiness, 
where Trust = s/e, and Trustworthiness = min{r/s, 1} if s > 0, else 0. 
S evaluates the short-sighted program’s goal achievement after Investor and Trustee 
decisions have been made. In addition to valuing any portion of the endowment kept, an 
Investor’s short-sighted program values maximally recouping profitable returns on any 
investment made. Thus, to reasonably evaluate opportunity captured by an Investor we consider 
how much of the endowment was kept and how much of the multiplied investment was recouped 
by calculating (e – s + r)/(e + 2s). Accordingly, an Investor’s S is maximized (= 1) when all 
endowment was kept (in which case s = 0 and r = 0), or if – in addition to any endowment kept – 
the maximum possible profitable return from the investment was recouped (i.e., r = 3s). A 
Trustee’s S is maximized (= 1) when s > 0 and r = 0 and is minimized (= 0) when either s = 0 or 
when s > 0 and r = 3s. 
The consummation of a cooperative trust-based relationship requires that both trust and 
trustworthiness be demonstrated. Trust is demonstrated by the invested amount of endowment at 
risk. Trustworthiness is demonstrated by proportion of investment voluntarily reciprocated to the 
Investor. A cooperative trust-based relationship fails to be established when either the Investor or 
the Trustee has pursued maximum opportunism. As such, L = 0 when s = 0 or when r = 0.  
The relationship between s and r should also be predictive of emotion activation.  Notice 
that L increases with s. For a fixed s, L also increases with r. SI decreases with s, and increases 
with r for a fixed s, while ST increases with s and decreases with r for a fixed s. As detailed in 
Figure 1, L affects Sets 1, 2, 4, and 5, while SI and ST affect Sets 1 and 4.  Let us hold s constant 
and assume the loadings on L and S are approximately equal.  If we compare scenarios where r < 
s to scenarios where r > s, the aforementioned comparative statistics would predict that (i) there 
is higher emotion activation when r > s, and (ii) there is more conflicted emotion activation when 
s > r.   The first prediction is due to upregulation of Sets 1 and 2 and downregulation of Sets 4 
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and 5.    The second prediction is due to downregulation of all sets, creating “conflicted” emotion 
activation of both negative and positive sets, albeit lesser positive emotion activation than where 
r > s.   The prediction of conflicted emotions holds true even if the loadings on L are much 
smaller than on SI or ST.   
Prior research has found that when s is relatively large (e.g., greater than half of the 
endowment), r tends to exceed s, whereas when s is relatively small, r tends to be equal or less 
than s (e.g., see Ostrom and Walker, 2003).  Given we find this same distribution, the above 
predictions should hold:  L becomes larger as s and r increase.  SI is largest when s is large and r 
> s.  The effect of ST is ambiguous, as it increases with s but decreases with r.    
In summary, emotions are triggered by computational assessments of short- and long-
sighted programs’ successes and failures. Positive emotional states are maximally experienced 
when trigger values are largest (= 1) and negative emotional states are maximally experienced 
when trigger values are smallest (= 0). According to their design functions, triggered emotions 
either contribute to the reinforcement of successes or the reduction of failures by upregulating or 
downregulating specific programs in self and others. We tested whether constellations of specific 
antecedents (the L and S triggers produced by Trust game interaction) reliably predict specific 
sets of emotional experiences. 
 
2. Design, Predictions and Procedures 
2.1. Natural Experiment Design 
We conducted a Trust game in which the Investor received an endowment of $10 and 
could send any portion of it to the Trustee, with the amount sent tripled (see Appendix A 
instructions). The Trustee then decided how much of the tripled investment, or income, to return 
(or else keep). Following the Trust game we administered a 20-item emotional status survey
3
 
                                               
3 To avoid experimenter demand effects that might result by soliciting reports on only a few select emotional states 
commonly ascribed to failed trust-based interactions (i.e., anger and guilt) and identified in the literature (e.g., 
Ketelaar and Au 2003), we constructed a survey of a large array of emotional states, based on the Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS), a self-report measure of positively and negatively valenced affect state activations 
developed by Watson et al. (1988) that has been demonstrated across large non-clinical samples to be a reliable and 
valid measure of these states (Crawford and Henry 2004). Consistent with the moderately high reliability of internal 
consistency reported previously by Watson et al. (1988) and others (e.g. (Jolly et al., 1994; Mehrabian, 1998; 
Roesch, 1998) we found the Cronbach alpha coefficient was 0.909 For the Positive Affect Scale and 0.874 for the 
Negative Affect Scale of our 20 item emotion survey. 
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(see the Appendix) in which participants reported how much they felt activation of each of 20 
emotional states (on a five point scale labeled (1) very slightly or not at all, (2) a little, (3) 
moderately, (4) quite a bit, (5) extremely) as a consequence of their recent game interactions and 
outcomes. The computer software presented all emotional states on one screen in a randomized 
order, different from that suggested in Table 1 (see Appendix B emotion survey).  Using this 
laboratory implementation of the Trust game that engaged participants in one-shot anonymous 
economic interactions, followed by a well-established emotional status survey, we investigated 
whether emotional experiences were reported in a patterned and predicted way as a consequence 
of game outcomes.  
2.2. Predictions 
Inspired by functional theories of social emotions (Trivers 1981; Cosmides and Tooby 
1989), Nesse (1990, p.275; 1999, p.458) made predictions (not yet tested) about how specific 
emotions mediating reciprocity would be triggered by the four types of interaction patterns 
produced by a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. While our study differs in that it examines a 
wider set of emotions and single anonymous interactions, we contend that emotions should still 
be predictable independent of so called “one-shot” cues. Our evolved psychology errs to caution 
by processing information about one-shot interactions with uncertain resource asymmetries 
under the premise that they may in fact be repeated in the future (e.g., see Delton et al. 2011). 
We also suspect that Investors who make trust-based choices discover the consequent effects on 
their payoffs and extend this information when constructing generalizable models about the 
trustworthiness of Trustees in the population (e.g., the experimental subject pool). Working with 
these assumptions, this study takes a natural experiment approach, examining the relationship 
between participants’ endogenous generation of Trust game outcomes and consequential reports 
of multiple emotions. Like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Trust game is another model for 
transactions that require trust, albeit a model of asynchronous (rather than synchronous) trust-
based exchange.  
With the set of predictions below, generated by Valence Models and the Recalibrational 
Model, we tested assumptions and compared how well different models of emotional experience 
predict the emotions reported by participants who had just completed Trust games. 
Valence Models 
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P1: In all three versions of the Valence Model predicted below (P1.1-P1.3), emotions 
show positive correlation within the Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA) set.  
P1.1: PA and NA sets are independent: no correlation (= 0) is expected between them.  
P1.2: PA and NA sets are strictly interdependent with negative (= -1) correlation between 
them. Consistent with a purely “bipolar” model of valence, reports of simultaneously 
experienced strong positive emotion and strong negative emotion are unexpected. 
P1.3: Interdependence is unrestricted between emotions in the PA and NA sets. While 
negative correlation is expected between sets, positive correlation between items in PA 
and NA sets can also occur. 
Recalibrational Model 
P2: Conflicted minds produce conflicted emotions: at times involving positive correlation 
between (simultaneously experienced) positive and negative emotions.  
P3: Emotion experiences are reported in a patterned way according to a multivariate set 
of shared recalibrational features (i.e., positive and/or negative recalibration effects, 
targeting short- and/or long-sighted programs, intra and/or interpersonally).  
P4: L and S (variables evaluating outcomes from Trust game interactions) predict the 
patterned experience of emotions for the 4 testable sets of the Recalibration Model better 
than for the 2 sets of the Valence Models. 
 
2.3. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment, programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), was conducted at 
Chapman University’s Economic Science Institute. Participants were recruited from a campus-
wide subject pool consisting primarily of undergraduate students.  
There were eight experimental sessions, each lasting approximately thirty-five minutes. 
No participant participated more than once. Each session had between 18 and 24 participants, 
seated in individual cubicles, and was conducted as follows. An experimenter read the 
instructions aloud explaining experimental procedures and payoffs while every participant 
followed along with their own copy of the instructions. After finishing the instructions, 
participants were given five minutes to privately write down their answers to several quiz 
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questions. After participants completed the quiz, the experimenter distributed a printed copy of 
the correct quiz answers. To ensure understanding, any remaining questions were answered 
privately. 
 Participants, randomly assigned to one of two roles: “person 1” (Investor) or “person 2” 
(Trustee), interacted anonymously in the Trust game over a local computer network, then 
completed the 20 item survey in which they reported the intensity of various emotional states 
consequent on their decisions, game interactions, and resulting outcomes. Earnings from the 
Trust game plus $7 for arriving to the experiment on time and participating were paid out 
privately at the end of the experiment. 
 
3. Results 
In this section, we report general results of the Trust game and the emotional status 
survey. In section 3.1 we investigate whether 20 emotions were experienced in a patterned way 
that conforms to predictions of the Recalibrational Model or predictions of Valence Models. In 
section 3.2 we examine the full models of emotional experiences according to four triggers 
(based on computation of adaptive problems consequent of economic decisions and interactions), 
comparing the fit of the unrestricted Valence Model and the Recalibrational Model. 
We found no significant differences between the eight sessions and report the joint results 
of all 170 participants. Figure 2 displays the scatter plot of the amount sent and the amount 
returned. There was substantial variability in individual behavior. On average, Investors sent 
$6.01 (SD = 3.64) and Trustees returned $6.16 (SD = 5.92), resulting in profits of $10.14 (SD = 
3.72) and $11.88 (SD = 7.12), respectively. These results are consistent with previous findings of 
Berg et al. (1995). Likewise, there was substantial variability in individual reports of emotional 
experience. The average reported emotional state (as a result of Trust game interactions) had a 
mean of 2.20 (median = 1, SD = 1.45), near 2 (“a little”). Ratings on every emotional state 
ranged from 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“extremely”). While the modal report for most 
(17/20) emotional states was 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) modes were also seen at 3 for happy 
and 5 for content and appreciative. Reports of 1 were more frequent for emotional states in the 
negative set than for the positive set (1218/1700 versus 527/1700, respectively), contributing to 
significantly lower intensity of reported negative states (M = 1.61, SD = .77) than positive states 
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(M = 2.80, SD = 1.08) according to Wilcoxon matched-pairs tests (Z = 7.605, p < .001). This 
pattern of significantly lower reported negative states was observed in both Investors (Z = 5.853, 
p < .001) and Trustees (Z = 4.888, p < .001). We constructed an “activation” score based on 
individuals’ average reports across all emotions. Upon exploration of the data distribution of 
activation scores with regards to game outcomes (see Figure 2) we discovered that where trust 
was extended (s > 0) and trustworthiness demonstrated (s < r), both Investors and Trustees 
(Investor Mdn =2.40, Trustee Mdn =2.55, 34 pairs) experienced more activation than did the 
Investors and Trustees (Investor Mdn =2.08, Trustee Mdn =2.12, 40 pairs) where trustworthiness 
was not demonstrated (0 < s and s ≥ r). A Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test was used to 
compare average activation (Investor: Z = 2.834, p =.005; Trustee: Z = 3.821, p < .001). 
 
3.1 Shared Features of Emotions 
Valence Models assume two factors: one comprised of a standard set of positive 
emotional states that positively correlate with one another [appreciative, happy, content, 
cheerful, triumphant, inspired, secure, proud, believable, and surprised], and the other 
comprised of a standard set of negative emotional states that positively correlate with one 
another [disgusted, jealous, aggravated, frustrated, angry, depressed, sad, embarrassed, 
ashamed, and guilty]
 4
. Using exploratory factor analysis, we rejected that a two-factor model fit 
the data best, as the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) was inferior to models with three, four, 
five, six, seven, and eight factors
5
. Consistent with P1, item analysis indicated that not all (43 of 
45) correlations were significantly positive between positive states, nor between all (36 of 45) 
negative states.  
Consistent with P1.3 and P2, cross tabulation indicated occurrences of simultaneously 
activated positive and negative emotions. We observed 57 cases from 13 (7.64% of) respondents 
reporting activation of positively valenced (P) and negatively valenced (N) emotions that were 
both felt “extremely” (= 5); 231 cases from 34 (20% of) respondents reporting activation of P 
and N emotions that were both felt in the range from “quite a bit” to “extremely” (≥ 4); 973 cases 
from 69 (40.59% of) respondents reporting activation of P and N emotions that were both felt in 
                                               
4 These “standard” sets were based on the PANAS (e.g., Watson et al. 1988). 
5 Results are available upon request. 
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the range from “moderately” to “extremely” (≥ 3); and 2653 cases from 114 (67.06%) 
respondents reporting positive and negative states that were both felt in the range from “a little” 
to “extremely” (≥ 2). We also examined simultaneous activation of the 9 positively valenced (P) 
emotions (not including surprise) and the 10 negatively valenced (N) emotions and constructed a 
“conflicted” score (valued 1-5) based on the maximum level at which any pair of P and N 
emotions were both equally activated (i.e., the min{max P, max N}). We find that where trust 
was extended but trustworthiness not demonstrated (0 < s and s ≥ r), both Investors and Trustees 
experienced more conflicted emotions (Investor Mdn =2.00, Trustee Mdn =3.00, 40 pairs) than 
did the Investors and Trustees (Investor Mdn =1.00, Mdn =1.00, N=34 pairs) where 
trustworthiness was demonstrated (0 < s < r). According to the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney) test the medians of conflicted scores are significantly different (Investor: Z = 
3.204, p = .001; Trustee: Z = 3.347, p < .001).
6
 
We used Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)
7
 to measure how well our data on reported 
emotional states fit the Recalibrational Model and variants of the Valence Models. Each variant 
of the Valence Model shares the assumption that positive correlations exist among individuals’ 
reporting positive states and positive correlations exist among individuals’ reporting negative 
states. Therefore, in all Valence Models we constrained each emotion to load onto only one of 
the two factors. However, because each variant of the Valence Model has a different assumption 
concerning relationships that might exist among simultaneously experienced of positive and 
negative states, they differ only in the constraints they impose on the positive and negative factor 
correlations. Model 1 constrains the factors to have a zero correlation (where positive states bear 
no relationship with negative states), Model 2 constrains the factors to a correlation of negative 
one (as would be appropriate if the experience of emotional states was only possible on a bipolar 
continuum), and Model 3 imposes no restrictions on the factors’ correlation. 
                                               
6 These significantly greater conflicted scores are not simply reflecting greater activation, however, as they are 
found among the otherwise lower activation set where extended trust failed to elicit trustworthiness, rather than 
among the set where extended trust successfully elicited trustworthiness and significantly greater activation was 
found (see Figure 2). 
7 We used Stata version 12.1 and the ‘SEM’ procedure (Structural Equations Model) finding the fit for maximum 
likelihood.  One participant was dropped who reported the same value for all emotional states. Additionally, we 
omitted surprise from both the Recalibrational Model’s and Valence models’ fit tests because, being the only 
emotional state included in the Recalibrational Model Set 3, it would have produced an automatic significant loading 
within the Recalibrational Model, unfairly biasing results in its favor.  
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Summaries of CFA results for the three Valence models and the Recalibrational model 
are shown in Table 2. The lesser Bayesian information criterion (BIC), lesser root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA), greater comparative fit index (CFI), and greater log-likelihood 
(LL) made it apparent that Model 1 fit better than Model 2, and that Model 3 fit better than 
Model 1.
8
 The difference between Model 3 and Model 1 was statistically significant (X
2
(1) = 
48.01, p < .001). Consistent with P1.3, Model 3’s correlation between positive and negative 
factors was -.70 and significantly different from zero and from -1 (p < .001, 95% CI [-.787, -
.614]). 
In Table 2 we describe the derived CFA fit from the Recalibrational Model as “Model 
R”. Model R predicted the patterned experience of emotions according to the four factors 
corresponding to Set 1, Set 2, Set 4, and Set 5 of the Recalibrational Model (see Table 1). 
Consistent with P3, all emotional states loaded positively and significantly (at a 1% level) onto 
the predicted latent factors of Model R, but not the predicted latent factors of Valance Model 3.
9 
With a greater LL, greater CFI, lesser RMSEA and lesser BIC, Model R provided a better fit 
than the unrestricted Valence Model 3 (according to guidelines set forth by Gefen et al. 2011). 
 
3.2. Comparison of Structural Equation Model Fit 
We used Structural Equation modeling to compare the fit of the Recalibrational Model to 
the fit of the Unrestricted Valence Model. To compare these models we tested both with triggers 
S and L, as computed from game interactions. Results of both exercises are shown in Table 3. 
Given that we did not find support for either perfect independence or interdependence in section 
3.1, we did not restrict correlations and allowed all latent factors to freely correlate in both 
models.
10
 The Recalibrational Model has more factors than the Valence Model, which could 
arguable lead to “overfitting” – having a better fit by describing more error instead of predicted 
                                               
8 While neither model has good approximate model fit according to guidelines proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999), 
we caution readers that there is substantial disagreement in the literature about interpreting such guidelines (Marsh, 
Hau, and Wen 2004; Beauducel and Wittmann 2005; Fan and Sivo 2005; Yuan 2005; Tomarken and Waller 2005; 
Barrett 2007). 
9 Results available upon request. 
10 Comparative measures penalized for additional variables. Given that all between factor correlations were 
significant for the unrestricted Valence Model but not for the Recalibrational Model, this choice should bias against 
the Recalibrational Model’s relative fit superiority. 
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relationship. To avoid overfitting, we report the BIC, which penalizes for added variables. 
Finally, we report the difference between models, assessing whether the better fit was 
statistically significant despite the difference in factors seen in Table 3. 
As with CFA, we found superior results via SEM for the Recalibrational Model, 
consistent with P4. Despite penalizing for additional fitted variables, the difference was 
significant. In the Recalibration Model, all of the latent DV triggers’ coefficients were significant 
(below 5%) with the predicted sign (see Table 4), whereas in the Unrestricted Valence Model not 
all (17 of 19) of the trigger’s coefficients were significant (see Table 4).  Finally, we found the 
overall equation level goodness of fit higher for the Recalibration Model. 
 
4. Discussion 
Using confirmatory factor analysis to assess latent sets, and structural equation models to 
assess triggers on latent sets we demonstrated that the Recalibrational Model predicts the 
experience of predicted emotional states (specifically, five latent sets of these) following the 
Trust game, strongly and significantly outperforming the Valence Models.  
The important take-away from results of our model comparisons is that we provide an 
improvement over the widely accepted Valence Models used in predicting emotional reports, and 
that we can additionally predict the activation of conflicted emotional states which have received 
relatively little attention in the emotion literature (though see Lerner and Keltner 2000; Fong 
2006). In addition to better fit, our Recalibrational Model is interpretable because it is derived 
from principles of recalibrational theory. Below we discuss potential sources of unexplained 
variance, consider future directions for further exploring the predicted effects of recalibrational 
emotions on trust-based interactions, and suggest some implications of having conflicted minds 
for both scientific and well-being pursuits.  
We consider two potential classes of explanations for currently unexplained variation in 
how strongly emotional experiences are rated by participants: first, that participants either have 
imperfect access to their emotional states, differing interpretations of the emotion labels, or the 
fidelity of their reports is compromised, and second, that there is heterogeneity in the experience 
of certain emotions (e.g., guilt). 
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People who are asked to rate single emotions may not be able to accurately describe their 
emotional states (Ellsworth and Tong 2006) if emotion experiences are more often and 
accurately described with multiple words (Izard 1977), or with different words among different 
people. While we acknowledge that language could present problems for this research, the 
success of previous research on self-reported emotions in conjunction with experimental games 
(Ketelaar and Au 2003) gave us encouragement in pursuing measures of self-reported emotions 
following an economic game. Nevertheless, analysis of emotion reports revealed a “floor effect” 
that might have resulted from a problem with the instrument used, untruthful results, a problem 
interpreting emotion labels, and difficulty identifying and reporting emotional states. 
Nemanick and Munz (1994) suggested that the PANAS scale’s lower anchor may not be 
properly constructed to form a true lower pole. The PANAS response option “1”, the lowest 
response possible on the five point Likert, is labeled with a combination of two state levels: “not 
at all” and “very slightly”. By combining both state levels into a single response option a larger 
proportion of response types from the possible spectrum (not at all to always) may accumulate at 
that value. Future research should consider restructuring the response options and testing 
whether a different distribution of responses results. 
Data quality may also have been affected if participants made untruthful reports. 
Experimental economists are particularly concerned that participants “will not ‘tell the truth’ 
unless incentives make truth telling compatible with maximizing utility” (Lopes 1994, p.218). 
According to a meta-review by Camerer and Hogarth (1999) there is no clear evidence that 
additional financial incentives would improve the quality of responses in a simple survey task 
like ours. In fact, it has been noted that for short tasks like PANAS surveys that people are 
known to voluntarily complete without problem (because they have sufficient intrinsic 
motivation to do so), an attempt at increasing participation via financial incentives often 
“backfires” with counter-intentional effects (e.g., see Mellstrom and Johannesson 2008). 
Nevertheless, wary of the possibility that participants may have been incentivized to use 
efficiency tactics to expediently complete the survey (such as marking all responses with the 
same), we reviewed our data and found only one apparent case
11
 of such behavior (< 1% of 
sample). 
                                               
11 This individual reported 3s on all emotions. 
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A battery of 20 emotional states (like in the PANAS) may be too broad for the purpose of 
studies like ours.  Self-access to some of the emotional states studied may be limited and 
interpretation of labels may not be uniform. We chose this battery because it is comparable 
among widely used measures of multiple emotional states, however future studies on trust and 
emotions would benefit from a select set more appropriate to the problems studied. In selecting a 
refined set, universally interpretable and recognizable emotional states should be considered. We 
suggest appreciative, happy, proud, frustrated, angry, and guilty: a selected set with balanced 
valance that is representative of the functional categories covered by our model. Additionally, we 
observed that the emotional states represented in this selected set were individually predicted 
well (see Table 4) and demonstrated less of a floor effect than the other emotional states we 
studied (total 1s reported were 479/1020 or 47% versus 1266/2380 or 53.2%, respectively). 
By triangulating with more objective neurological, physiological, and behavioral 
measures of emotional states some of the discussed limitations of itemized self-reports could be 
overcome. While untruthful reporting and reports by abnormal types in the population may occur 
and should be of consider by future research, we do not expect that these factors account for a 
large portion of observed variance. 
While we have developed theory of emotions’ ultimate function (i.e., what the 
mechanisms were selected to do) and derived our predictions of antecedents from it, this study 
only tests the emotions’ proximate functioning (i.e., how and when the mechanisms are 
triggered). Future studies can take the Recalibrational Model one step further and test for 
ultimate functions by examining whether the future actions of those individuals who report 
emotions under the predicted conditions are affected as theory predicts. Three studies which we 
know of have taken this approach to testing ultimate functions already: Ketelaar and Au (2003) 
who demonstrated how the experience of guilt leads to choices of cooperation over opportunism, 
Fehr and Gachter (2002) who demonstrated that angry individuals are more likely to engage in 
costly punishment, and Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) who have shown that Investor happiness 
and gratitude increase trust in the Trust game. 
The experience of conflicted emotions has been discussed by others (Cacioppo, Gardner, 
and Berntson 1999) and evoked with wins and losses in the laboratory (Larsen, McGraw, and 
Cacioppo 2001; Larsen et al. 2004), as well as by trust-based interaction in our study. However, 
conflicted emotions are not well appreciated as a core trait of human nature, and may appear as 
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flaws of human nature that interfere with rationality (Sherer 1984; Elster 1995). While some 
researchers have long moved past the bipolar affect models, instead recognizing that positive and 
negative affect are at times independent dimensions (e.g., see Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 
1988), psychophysiologists (Driscoll, Tranel, and Anderson 2009; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, 
and Hamm 1993) neuroscientists (Proverbio, Zani, and Adorni 2008; Screenivas, Boehm, and 
Linden 2012) behavioral economists (Morretti and di Pellegrino 2010; Brandts, Riedl, and van 
Winden 2009; Van den Berg, Dewitte, and Warlop 2008; Morris 1995) and decision scientists 
(Hogarth, Portell, Cuxart, and Kolev 2011; Reid and Gonzalez-Vallejo 2009; Schlosser, 
Dunning, and Fetchenhauer 2013) continue to use bipolar affect scales (for example, the Self-
Assessment-Manikin valence scale developed by Lang (1980)). Our study cautions against 
assuming that the explanatory power provided by the Valence Model is sufficient for 
understanding relationships between trust-based behavior and emotions. We suggest that more 
complex multivariate models, such as the Recalibrational Model, better track the triggered 
experience of conflicted emotions and subsequent behaviors. 
In light of our model, we have identified the mechanics that could produce an emotional 
equilibrium between partners: a condition in which the emotional impact of partners’ behavior 
on each other and on themselves is one in which all engaged programs are kept in the same 
relative state (before and after action). An important implication of this stable equilibrium is that 
even under such conditions, the mind is expected to remain conflicted. The recognition of a 
conflicted mind and the experience of conflicted emotions challenges our intuitions of a “self’s” 
singular internal interests and the consonance of a non-contradictory self-representation 
generally attributed to a sane mind. While the implications of a modular recalibrational theory of 
emotions might be existentially and even epistemologically difficult to grapple with, we extend 
the following practical implications for mental health professionals and laypeople alike. 
Psychotherapists often treat patients who complain of and suffer from emotional states – 
and it is not uncommon for patients that patronize these professionals to seek an escape from 
unwelcomed emotions (e.g., Nesse 1991, 2000). Treatment of these emotions, whether through 
behavioral intervention or psycho-pharmaceutical treatment, may benefit from the degree to 
which psychologists, psychiatrists, and counselors are informed of (1) the functional uniqueness 
and similarities distinguishing the emotions and their taxonomic classifications, and (2) the 
choice dilemmas and post-decision situations from which emotional states precipitate. The 
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Recalibrational Model suggests that there are distinct situations following trust-based 
interactions that not only lead to the activation of “positive” feelings or “negative feelings”, but 
that also might activated conflicted feelings.  We expect that the Recalibrational Model also 
applies to social and moral dilemmas. Dewitte and De Cremer (2010) have identified that the 
inherent cooperation vs. opportunism tradeoff structures of social dilemmas share common 
features with self-control problems. Similarly, Gomez-Minambres and Schniter (2013) propose 
an emotionally regulated dual-program model to explain activation of recalibrational emotions as 
a consequence of decisions made in self-control dilemmas. 
Personal and social life entail suffering and happiness because both positive and negative 
emotional states serve needed functions, recalibrating our own inner-workings as well as the 
inner-workings of those that we interact with. Given the uncertain future, we need to constantly 
engage in recalibration of ourselves and others to make the most of opportunities given our 
needs.
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 Figure 1: Complete Recalibrational Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: (1.1) Investor (i) and Trustee (t) each have two weights U and V, where U ≥ 0 and V ≥ 0, determining the relative power of 
conflicting long-sighted and short-sighted programs, respectively. The balance of weights determines behavior propensity via decision 
function, where U weakly increases and V weakly decreases amount sent (= s) or amount returned (= r), for the Investor (i) and 
Trustee (t), respectively. (1.2) Emotions compute trigger values S and L resulting from game outcomes. Positive emotional states are 
maximally experienced when their trigger values are largest (= 1) and negative emotional states are maximally experienced when their 
trigger values are smallest (= 0). (1.3) The weights are up- and down-regulated by arrays of positive and negative emotions  
produced by self and other. Thus the weights are dynamically updated after being targeted by recalibrational emotions. 
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 Figure 2: Bubble Plot of the Amount Sent and the Amount Returned 
 
 
Note: Observations were plotted with bubbles, where the relative size indicates the number of observations.  The smallest 
bubble plotted represents one observation and the largest bubble plotted represents eight observations. Colored regions 
indicate observations that are significantly (p<.001) more “conflicted” (where 0<s≥r) and more “activated” (where 0<s<r) 
than among all other observations according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. 
 
  
 Table 1: Specific Classifying Features of Emotional States with Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Targets 
Set Emotional State 
Functional Features 
Facilitating 
Adaptive Goal(s) 
Recalibrational Effect Recalibrational Target 
U:  Long-sighted V: Short-sighted Positive  Negative Intrapersonal Interpersonal 
1 
Appreciative X X X  U U 
Happy X X X  U,V U 
Content X X X  U,V U 
Cheerful X X X  U,V U 
Triumphant X X X  U,V  
Inspired X X X  U,V  
Secure X X X  U,V  
2 
Proud X  X  U  
Believable X  X    U†  
3 Surprised X X X X   U‡   
4 
Disgusted X X  X U V 
Jealous X X  X U V 
Aggravated X X  X U V 
Frustrated X X  X U V 
Angry X X  X U V 
Depressed X X  X U V 
Sad X X  X U V 
5 
Embarrassed X   X V V 
Ashamed X   X V V 
Guilty X   X V  
Note: X’s indicate classifying features of emotional states. Cells populated under “Intrapersonal” and “Interpersonal” specify the 
targets (U = long-sighted program, and V = short-sighted program) in self and others that those emotional states’ recalibrations were 
designed to affect. 
† Believable intrapersonally targets the long-sighted program only for the Trustee.  
‡ Surprise may either positively or negatively target the long-sighted program in one’s self according to discovery that one has under- 
or over-expected achievement of the long-sighted program’s goal. 
 
  
 Table 2: Details of Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
Model Specification N DF 
Log-
likelihood 
Root Mean 
Square of 
Approximation 
[90% CI] 
Comparative 
Fit Index 
Bayesian 
Information 
Criteria 
Difference in fit 
compared to Model 
R 
1 
Independent Valence Model: 
Zero (0) PA/NA Correlation 
169 57 - 4,419.15 
.144 
[.134,.156] 
.767 9,130.71 
Chi2(6)= 147.47 
p < .001 
2 
Bipolar Valence Model: 
Negative (-1) PA/NA 
Correlation 
169 57 -4, 371.49 
.131 
 [.120,.142] 
.808 9,035.39 
Chi2(6)= 99.81 
p < .001 
3 
Unrestricted Valence Model: 
Unrestricted PA/NA 
Correlation 
169 58 -4, 371.14 
.131 
[.120,.142] 
.808 9,039.82 
Chi2(5)= 99.46 
p < .001 
R 
Recalibrational Model: 
5 Factors 
169 63 -4, 271.68 
.099 
[.088,.111] 
.892 8,866.55  
Note: One observation, where the participant reported the same value for all emotions was dropped. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Details of Structural Equation Fit Analyses 
Model N DF 
Log-
likelihood 
Root Mean 
Square of 
Approximation 
[90% CI] 
Comparative 
Fit Index 
Bayesian 
Information 
Criteria 
Difference in fit 
compared to 
Unrestricted 
Valence 
Unrestricted Valence Model 169 62 - 4,784.99 
.125 
[.130,.149] 
.799 9,888.03  
Recalibrational Model 169 69 - 4,681.98 
.099 
[.088,.109] 
.880 9,717.92 
Chi2(7)=103.01  
p < .001 
 
  
 Table 4: Structural Loadings and Equation Level Goodness of Fit for Valence  
and Recalibrational Models 
Valence Model Recalibration Model 
Structural 
 
Beta SE R2 
  
Beta SE R2 
PA             S .202 *** (.063) .439 L1 S .180 *** (.056) .427 
 
L .702 *** (.043) 
  
L .691 *** (.044) 
 NA             S -.335 *** (.065) .328 L2 L .644 *** (.068) .415 
 
L -.590 *** (.054) 
 
L4 S -.348 *** (.064) .330 
       
L -.589 *** (.054) 
 
      
L5 L -.199 ** (.082) .039 
Measurement 
Beta/ 
Intercept SE R2 
  
Beta/ 
Intercept SE R2 
Appreciative PA .835 *** (.025) .697 
 
L1 .833 *** (.025) .693 
 
Constant 1.105 
    
Constant 1.135 
   Happy PA .919 *** (.015) .845 
 
L1 .921 *** (.015) .848 
 
Constant 1.408 
    
Constant 1.439 
   Content PA .831 *** (.026) .690 
 
L1 .832 *** (.026) .693 
 
Constant 1.586 
    
Constant 1.614 
   Cheerful PA .876 *** (.020) .767 
 
L1 .873 *** (.021) .761 
 
Constant 1.023 
    
Constant 1.055 
   Triumphant PA .795 *** (.030) .632 
 
L1 .793 *** (.030) .629 
 
Constant 1.044 
    
Constant 1.071 
   Inspired PA .665 *** (.044) .443 
 
L1 .657 *** (.045) .432 
 
Constant .866 
    
Constant .893 
   Secure PA .639 *** (.047) .408 
 
L1 .640 *** (.047) .409 
 
Constant 1.441 
    
Constant 1.461 
   Believable PA .507 *** (.059) .257 
 
L2 .573 *** (.062) .328 
 
Constant 1.373 
    
Constant 1.418 
   Proud PA .658 *** (.045) .433 
 
L2 .743 *** (.057) .553 
 
Constant 1.256 
    
Constant 1.314 
   Disgusted NA .808 *** (.029) .654 
 
L4 .800 *** (.030) .640 
 
Constant 2.107 
    
Constant 2.104 
   Jealous NA .507 *** (.059) .258 
 
L4 .510 *** (.059) .260 
 
Constant 1.875 
    
Constant 1.880 
   Aggravated NA .901 *** (.018) .812 
 
L4 .907 *** (.017) .823 
 
Constant 2.188 
    
Constant 2.198 
   Frustrated NA .885 *** (.020) .782 
 
L4 .889 *** (.019) .791 
 
Constant 2.121 
    
Constant 2.129 
   Angry NA .870 *** (.021) .758 
 
L4 .873 *** (.021) .763 
 
Constant 2.179 
    
Constant 2.185 
   Depressed NA .670 *** (.045) .449 
 
L4 .660 *** (.046) .436 
 
Constant 2.129 
    
Constant 2.124 
   Sad NA .744 *** (.037) .554 
 
L4 .737 *** (.037) .543 
 
Constant 2.114 
    
Constant 2.111 
   Embarrassed NA .430 *** (.066) .185 
 
L5 .679 *** (.049) .461 
 
Constant 1.743 
    
Constant 1.526 
   Ashamed NA .115 
 
(.079) .013 
 
L5 .902 *** (.035) .814 
 
Constant 1.610 
    
Constant 1.714 
   Guilty NA .095 
 
(.079) .009 
 
L5 .816 *** (.038) .665 
 
Constant 1.496 
    
Constant 1.598 
   Note: Standardized beta reported.  Equation level R2 reported for each dependent variable.  
* indicates statistical significance at p < .10, ** significant at p < .05, and *** at p < .01. 
 
 
